

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-13

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-07 ERDA-05 AF-08 ARA-06 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 EA-07 EUR-12 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01  
NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01  
OES-06 SS-15 USIA-06 SAJ-01 /124 W  
----- 098817 /70

R 222040Z DEC 76  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1849  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USLO PEKING  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USUN 6322

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, UN, CCD, UR, US  
SUBJECT: WRAP-UP OF 31ST UNGA DISARMAMENT DEBATE

1. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A BRIEF REVIEW OF  
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MAJOR DISARMAMENT-RELATED ACTIONS BY THE 1976 UNGA;  
ASSESSES THE OUTCOME FROM THE US AND SOVIET STANDPOINTS;  
EXAMINES THE ROLE OF THE EC-9 AND OTHER KEY DELEGATIONS;  
AND SETS OUT A CHECKLIST OF SOME OF THE MAJOR QUESTIONS  
EMERGING FROM THE SESSION THAT WILL REQUIRE FURTHER  
ATTENTION AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION IN THE COMING MONTHS.

SEPTELS ASSESS RESULTS OFENMOD AND NONPROLIFERATION  
DEBATES. END SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW: TONE AND CONTENT OF THE DISARMAMENT DEBATE

2. THE 1976 7NGA ADOPTED 21 DISARMAMENT-RELATED RESOLUTIONS (DOWN FROM LAST YEAR'S RECORD OF 25) UNDER 18 AGENDA ITEMS. OF THESE 11 DEALT WITH NUCLEAR ISSUES, INCLUDING NUCLEAR TESTING, SALT, NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES (NWFZ'S), NON-PROLIFERATION, AND NUCLEAR NON-USE ASSURANCES. MANY RESOLUTIONS ESSENTIALLY REPRESENTED REITERATIONS OR CONTINUATIONS OF PREVIOUS UNGA VIEWS AND ACTIONS, BUT CAME SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENTS EMERGED FROM THE FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATES. PERHAPS THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS WERE THE US-SOVIET-FINNISH RESOLUTION OPENING THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION FOR SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION AND THE YUGOSLAV-LED RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE CONVENING OF A SPECIAL UNGA SESSION ON DISARMAMENT IN 1978.

3. OTHER NOTABLE ACTIONS INCLUDED ADOPTION OF TWO NON-PROLIFERATION-RELATED RESOLUTIONS, WITH BROAD SUPPORT AND A MINIMUM OF PUBLIC CONFRONTATION; THE CONSENSUS ADOPTION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS RESOLUTION CONTAINING FOR THE FIRST TIME AN EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLVING VERIFICATION PROBLEMS; AND THE RENEWAL OF DIRECT UNGA CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF NEGATIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES; I.E., UNDERTAKINGS NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES. ALSO NOTEWORTHY WAS THE INCREASED INTEREST SHOWN IN THE QUESTION  
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OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, ALTHOUGH THE SUPPRESSION BY A PROCEDURAL DEVICE OF A JAPANESE-INITIATED RESOLUTION ON THIS SUBJECT WAS A SETBACK FROM THE US(AND MORE BROADLY FROM THE WESTERN) POINT OF VIEW.

4. THE TONE OF THE DEBATE, LARGELY REFLECTED IN THE RESOLUTIONS, WAS MORE RESTRAINED THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. A NUMBER OF FACTORS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS, BUT ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THE DECISIONS OF SOME KEY DELEGATIONS (E.G., ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA) TO AWAIT THE SPECIAL SESSION FOR A MAJOR PUSH ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS. NONETHELESS, NONALIGNED AND NON-NUCLEAR STATES WERE BY NO MEANS SILENT AND COMPLACENT; MANY DELEGATIONS CONTINUED TO GIVE VIGOROUS EXPRESSION TO THEIR DEEP CONCERN OVER THE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS COMPETITION BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. MANY THIRD-WORLD SPEAKERS LEVELLED SHARP CRITICISM AGAINST THE US AND THE USSR FOR FAILING TO SLOW DOWN OR HALT THEIR ARMS COMPETITION, AND CLAIMED

THAT THERE EXISTS A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE LARGE SUMS SPENT ON ARMAMENTS AND THE DEEPENING GAP BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

5. THE CCD WAS SUBJECTED TO ESPECIALLY SHARP CRITICISM, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE WIDESPREAD EXPRESSION OF SATISFACTION THAT THE CCD HAD REPORTED AN CONCRETE RESULT (ENMOD) TO THE UNGA AFTER A LONG DRY SPELL. MANY NON-MEMBERS OF THE CCD, AS WELL AS SOME OF ITS MOST ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS, EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE CCD REMAINS AN ELITIST CLUB DOMINATED BY THE US AND USSR, WHICH PREVENT IT FROM ADDRESSING MAJOR DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS WHILE DIVERTING ITS EFFORTS TO SECONDARY ISSUES. NON-CCD MEMBERS ALSO COMPLAINED SPECIFICALLY THAT THEY HAD HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE IN DETAIL OR BE CONSULTED ABOUT THE ENMOD CONVENTION BEFORE BEING PRESSED TO ENDORSE IT. SERIOUS CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED THAT THIS CONSTITUTED AN UNACCEPTABLE PRECEDENT FOR PRESENTATION OF FUTURE MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS TO THE CONFIDENTIAL

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WORLD COMMUNITY.

6. AS FAR AS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARE CONCERNED, ENMOD PROVED TO BE THE MAJOR ISSUE GIVING RISE TO OPEN AND EXTENDED CONFRONTATION. NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE (NWFZ) ISSUES, WHICH WERE HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL AT THE 1975 UNGA, RECEIVED RELATIVELY LITTLE ATTENTION. RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING NWFZ'S IN AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTH ASIA REFLECTED THE ABSENCE OF ANY SERIOUS EFFORTS IN ANY REGION TO PROCEED WITH ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS TO CREATE A NWFZ ARRANGEMENT. EACH RES Served MORE OR LESS OPENLY AS A PRESSURE DEVICE AGAINST CERTAIN STATES IN EACH REGION (I.E., SOUTH AFRICA, ISRAEL, AND INDIA, RESPECTIVELY).

ASSESSMENT FROM THE US AND SOVIET STANDPOINTS

7. DESPITE THE GENERALLY CRITICAL TONE OF THE DEBATE, THE ACTUAL RESULTS OF THE UNGA SESSION WERE VERY POSITIVE IN TERMS OF MEETING SPECIFIC US INTERESTS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, WE WERE ABLE TO ACHIEVE OUR TWO PRIMARY OBJECTIVES--THE OPENING OF THE ENMOD CONVENTION AND THE ADOPTION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE NON-PROLIFERATION RESOLUTION (SEE SEPTELS ON THESE ISSUES). THE RESOLUTIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS ALSO MET BASIC US INTERESTS, ALTHOUGH IN THE LATTER CASES AN UNEXPECTEDLY CONSERVATIVE SWEDISH/MEXICAN STAND PRECLUDED ACTION AS FAR-REACHING AS WE WOULD HAVE LIKED IN PURSUING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STANDARDIZED SYSTEM FOR MEASURING AND REPORTING MILITARY EXPENDITURES. STRONG NON-ALIGNED DESIRE TO FACILITATE A POSITIVE US ATTITUDE

TOWARD THE PROPOSED SPECIAL SESSION WAS REFLECTED IN  
EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT THE RESOLUTION CONVENING THE  
SESSION AND LAUNCHING THE PREPARATORY WORK NOT PREJUDICE  
ANY ISSUES.

8. FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, THE RESULTS OF THE  
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DISARMAMENT DABATE CANNOT HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY SATISFACORY.  
ALTHOUGH THEY, TOO, CAN TAKE SATISFATION FROM THE  
SUCCESS OF THE ENMOD EFFORT CAMPAIGN, IN WHICH THEY INVESTED  
INTENSIVE, HIGH-LEVEL EFFORT, THE SOVIETS SUFFERED A  
NUMBER OF SETBACKS IN OTHER AREAS. THEIR LENGTHY  
"DISARMAMENT MEMORANDUM". DESPITE ITS SEND-OFF BY FONMIN  
GROMYKO IN HIS MAJOR PLENARY ADDRESS, PROMPTED LESS  
INTEREST THAN THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY EXPECTED; NEVERTHELESS,  
IT IS LIKELY TO SET THE FFOUNDATION FOR SOVIET POSITION  
ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES OVER AT LEAST THE NEAR FUTURE.

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----- 099058 /70

R 222040Z DEC 76  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1850  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
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VIGOROUS SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR POSITION ON THE PROPOSED SPECIAL SESSION (I.E., THAT IT SHOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR, AND BE FORMALLY LINKED TO, THE CONVENING OF A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE) MET WITH TOTAL FAILURE. WHEN THE SOVIETS SOUGHT TO OUTFLANK  
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NON-ALIGNED OPPOSITION TO THEIR POSITION BY CIRCULATING A WDC RESOLUTION ASSERTING SUCH A LINK, THEY MET WITH A SHARP REACTION AND EVENTUALLY HAD TO WITHDRAW THEIR RES. SIMILARLY, THE SOVIETS ABANDONED PLANS TO CIRCULATE A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR NEGOTIATION OF A PERCENTAGE CUT IN MILITARY BUDGETS OF SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBERS WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THIS APPROACH WOULD GENERATE MUCH LESS SUPPORT THEN THE SWEDISH/MEXICAN RESOLUTION.

9. PARTICULARLY NOTABLE WAS THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-UP BY THE SOVIETS ON THEIR ANNOUNCED CHANGE IN POSITION ON THE INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE. AT THE LAST MINUTE THEY MADE WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A PRO FORMA EFFORT TO AMEND THE IOPZ RESOLUTION TO DELETE REFERENCE TO "GREAT POWER RIVALRY," AND THEN USED THE COSPONSORS' UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE CHANGE AS A GROUND FOR ABSTAINING, THEREBY FUELING DOUBTS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENT. ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE FOR THE USSR THE RESOLUTION CARRYING FORWARD THEIR 1975 PROPOSAL TO BAN NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS RECEIVED A SUBSTANTIAL VOTE, WITH THE US AND THE EC-9 ALMOST ALONE IN ABSTENTION. PERHAPS MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE NEW SOVIET POSITION ON CTB VERIFICATION, ENVISAGING A FORM OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION, GENERATED CAUTIOUS BUT PERCEPTIBLE INTEREST AMONG LEADING CTB ACTIVITISTS.

ALLIED COOPERATION

10. AMONG OUR ALLIES, THE INCREASED EXTENT OF COORDINATION AMONG THE EC-9 ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES WAS PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY, ADVANCING SUBSTANTIALLY BEYOND THE

RUDIMENTARY STEPS BEGUN LAST YEAR. THE NINE VOTED AS A PERCEPTIBLE BLOC ON A NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING SUCH SENSITIVE ONES AS THOSE ON NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE SOUTH ASIAN NWFZ. ON AT LEAST FOUR OCCASIONS, THE DUTCH (HOLDING THE CURRENT PRESIDENCY) GAVE EXPLANATIONS OF CONFIDENTIAL

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VOTE "ON BEHALF OF" THE NINE. WITHIN THE NINE, THE DUTCH MAINTAINED THEIR TRADITIONAL ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR PROVIDING VALUABLE SUPPORT FOR OUR ENMOD EFFORT. HOWEVER, EFFORTS TO MAXIMIZE "NINE SOLIDARITY" CONTINUED TO FACE SOME INHERENT DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING THE GENERAL INDEPENDENCE OF FRENCH POLICY (E.G., ON ANY CCD-RELATED ISSUE), THE OCCASIONAL TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AND THE OTHERS, AND THE SOMETIMES CROSSED INTERESTS OF NATO AND EC-9 MEMBERSHIP. IN A MORE BROADLY BASED FORUM, PERIODIC MEETINGS OF THE BARTON GROUP PROVIDED OCCASIONS FOR EXCHANGES OF VIEW AMONG EC-9, US, JAPANESE, AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND, CANADIAN, AND NORWEGIAN DELEGATIONS.

11. AUSTRALIA AND CANADA TOOK MORE POSITIONS CLOSER TO OURS THAN IN THE PST, AND GENERALLY APPEARED MORE SENSITIVE TO US CONCERNS. AUSTRALIA'S IMPORTANT MODERATING ROLE IN UN ACTION ON IOPZ IS PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY, AS WAS STRONG CANADIAN SUPPORT ON ENMOD. NEW ZEALAND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TOOK A DETERMINEDLY INDEPENDENT COURSE ON MANY ISSUES; E.G., TAKING THE LEAD IN DRAFTING AND FLOOR-MANAGING THE CTB RESOLUTION (AND SHOWING RELATIVELY LITTLE INTEREST IN US CONCERNS OVER SUCH ISSUES AS VERIFICATION AND PNES), AND ABSTAINING ON THE ENMOD RESOLUTION. JAPANESE ATTENTION WAS LARGELY ABSORBED BY THEIR ILL-FATED CONVENTIONAL ARMS INITIATIVE; HOWEVER, THEY CONTINUED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE, IF SECONDARY, ROLE ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, EXERCISING A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON THE CTB RESOLUTION. (JAPAN WAS ALSO NOTABLE AS VIRTUALLY THE ONLY DELEGATION TO EXPRESS PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE MOST RECENT CHINESE ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS.)

PERFORMANCE OF MAJOR NONALIGNED DELEGATIONS

12. AMONG THE NONALIGNED, MEXICO AND SWEDEN CONTINUED TO PLAY MAJOR ROLES, THOUGH WITH SOME CHANGES OF APPROACH. MEXICO CONCENTRATED HEAVILY ON ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CONFIDENTIAL

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ENMOD CONVENTION, TAKING RELATIVELY PASSIVE STANDS ON MANY

OTHER ISSUES. SWEDEN'S CUSTOMARY ACTIVISM ON NUCLEAR ISSUES WAS HAMPERED BY UNCERTAINTY OVER THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POSITIONS ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. YUGOSLAVIA'S ATTENTION WAS DEVOTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO BEHIND-THE-SCENES WORK ON BEHALF OF THE SPECIAL SESSION RES, WHERE IT EXERCISED A FORCEFUL MODERATING INFLUENCE. NIGERIA AND INDIA PLAYED ACTIVE ROLES ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, HELPFULLY ON ENMOD BUT LESS SO ON OTHERS. INDIA'S CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH SOVIET POSITIONS (E.G., ON IOPZ, WDC, SPECIAL SESSION, AND ENMOD) MAY HAVE COMPROMISED ITS STATURE AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED, THOUGH AMB MISHRA REMAINED A POWERFUL PARLIAMENTARY FORCE.

ISSUES REQUIRING FOLLOW-UP ATTENTION

13. A LARGE NUMBER OF THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE 1976 UNGA WILL REQUIRE FOLLOW-UP ACTION. AMONG THE ISSUES THAT WILL NEED TO BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OVER THE COMING MONTHS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

A. SPECIAL SESSION. THE FIRST (ORGANIZATIONAL) MEETING OF THE SPECIAL SESSION PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO BE HELD MARCH 7-11. A KEY ISSUE AT THAT MEETING IS LIKELY TO BE THE DEVELOPMENT OF DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES FOR SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS OF THE PREPCOM, WHICH WILL CONSIDER SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE SPECIAL SESSION'S AGENDA. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE US WILL NEED TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SYG ITS VIEWS ON THE AGENDA AND ALL OTHER RELEVANT QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE SPECIAL SESSION BEFORE APRIL 15, 1977. OUR ALLIES WILL BE INTERESTED IN CONSULTATIONS ON SPECIAL SESSION ISSUES AT AN EARLY STAGE.

B. ENMOD. THE NEXT STEP ON ENMOD LIES WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT, WHICH MUST MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO OPEN THE CONVENTION FOR SIGNATURE. SECRETARIAT SOURCES SAY SOME CONFIDENTIAL

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

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TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO ENSURE THE EQUAL AUTHENTICITY OF  
THE FIVE NON-ENGLISH TEXTS, AND HAVE NOT SO FAR INDICATED  
A SPECIFIC TARGET DATE. WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE SOVIETS  
IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY  
SIGN THE CONVENTION WHEN IT IS OPENED AND ENCOURAGE OTHER  
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SUPPORTERS OF CONVENTION TO DO LIKEWISE. BEYOND THESE  
QUESTIONS THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER FURTHER  
EFFORTS TO ALLAY CONCERNS ABOUT THE SCOPE OF THE  
CONVENTION EXPRESSED WIDELY AT THE UNGA IN ORDER TO  
ENCOURAGE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE ADHERENCE TO THE CONVENTION.

C. CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE  
SURROUNDING UNGA ACTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS REFLECTED  
WIDESPREAD EXPECTATION THAT THE MOMENTUM ON THIS ISSUE  
ACHIEVED IN 1976 WILL BE MAINTAINED AND EVEN ACCELERATED  
IN 1977. THE INCLUSION IN THE RESOLUTION OF A SPECIFIC  
REFERENCE TO VERIFICATION PROBLEMS PROVIDES A BASIS FOR



CONCENTRATION ON THIS ISSUE IN THE CCD'S UPCOMING SESSION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ASSERTED SOVIET WILLINGNESS, AS STATED IN THEIR DISARMAMENT MEMORANDUM, TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE "NON-NATIONAL" MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

D. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. MANY OF OUR ALLIES HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW SOVIET POSITION ENVISAGING A FORM OF VERIFICATION BY CHALLENGE. WE CAN EXPECT OUR ALLIES AND SOME NON-ALIGNED -- NOT TO MENTION THE SOVIETS -- TO SEEK A CONSIDERED US RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIETS WILL PURSUE THE SUBJECT AT THE CCD IN VIEW OF THEIR POSITION, REFLECTED AGAIN IN THE SOVIET CTB RESOLUTION, THAT ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES MUST PARTICIPATE IN CTB NEGOTIATIONS.

E. MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS. THE PHRASE IN THE SOVIET RESOLUTION CALLING ON THE CCD TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS "WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS" PROVIDES A PROCEDURAL FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SERIES OF INFORMAL CCD MEETINGS ON THE SUBJECT. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THREE MAJOR CCD ACTORS - CANADA, JAPAN, AND SWEDEN - THAT ABSTAINED LAST YEAR VOTED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET MDW RESOLUTION THIS YEAR. (THE EC-9 AND US AGAIN ABSTAINED, CITING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE DOUBTS PROVOKED AT LAST YEAR'S CCD MEETINGS CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS CONCERNING MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS.) WE WILL NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND A US EXPERT AND CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES REGARDING OUR DECISION.

F. DISARMAMENT DECADE. THE NIGERIAN RESOLUTION ON THIS SUBJECT URGES THE CCD TO ADOPT A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT DURING 1977. IN DETERMINING HOW BEST TO DEAL WITH THIS AT THE CCD, WHERE IT IS LIKELY TO COME UP DURING THE SPRING SESSION, WE WILL HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND THE LIKELIHOOD THAT IT WILL ALSO BE A MAJOR TOPIC OF THE 1978 SPECIAL UNGA SESSION.

G. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. THE FATE OF THE JAPANESE INITIATIVE PROVIDES A POINTED REMINDER OF THE PROBLEMS POSED BY TOO-CLOSE WESTERN IDENTIFICATION WITH THIS ISSUE AT THE UN. THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER MEANS OF KEEPING THE ISSUE ALIVE WITH THE AIM OF FACILITATING ITS REVIVAL, PERHAPS IN A DIFFERENT FORM, AT THE NEXT UNGA OR AT THE SPECIAL SESSION. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVES AND OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH WESTERN

AND NONALIGNED INTERESTS CAN BE BROUGHT TOGETHER, TO EXAMINE POSSIBLE FIRST STEPS THAT WOULD BE FEASIBLE WITHIN THE UN CONTEXT, AND TO DETERMINE TACTICAL APPROACHES LIKELY TO INCREASE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN THE FUTURE. IN ALL THESE CONNECTIONS, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH OTHERS INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM, ESPECIALLY JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, UK, AND SINGAPORE, AS WELL AS WITH THOSE WHO ARE VAGUELY SUSPICIOUS (E. G., IRAN) AND THOSE WHO HAVE EXPRESSED OUTRIGHT CRITICISM (E. G., MEXICO, INDIA, NIGERIA).

H. MILITARY EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS. THE MEL RESOLUTION  
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ADOPTED THIS YEAR CALLS FOR COMMENTS FROM GOVERNMENTS ON THE 1976 EXPERTS' REPORT BEFORE APRIL 30, 1977. IT ALSO REQUESTS THE SYG TO NAME AN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP OF BUDGETARY EXPERTS TO ANALYZE THE COMMENTS AND MAKE ANY FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. IT IS GENERALLY EXPECTED THAT THE US, WHOSE EXPERT HAS PLAYED A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE PAST, WILL NOMINATE A NEW, BUDGETARY EXPERT FOR THIS GROUP. THE RELATIVELY OPEN-ENDED MANDATE ESTABLISHED FOR THE EXPERTS PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT LEEWAY FOR MOVING THE STUDY ALONG IN THE DIRECTION OF IMPLEMENTING A STANDARDIZED REPORTING PROCEDURE.

I. INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE. THOUGH SOVIET HANDLING OF THEIR ALLEGEDLY NEW POSITION ON THE IOPZ QUESTION UNDERCUT ITS IMMEDIATE PROPAGANDA IMPACT, THE QUESTION ITSELF REMAINS ALIVE AND THE POSSIBILITY REMAINS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL UNDERTAKE A MORE CONCERTED CAMPAIGN TO CAPITALIZE ON AN APPARENTLY FORTHCOMING POSITION. THEY MAY PRESS AHEAD BILATERALLY WITH THEIR STATED WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN TALKS WITH OTHER MAJOR POWERS ON RECIPROCAL LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION, AND THEY MAY SEEK TO PLAY SOME ROLE IN THE UN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO KEEP UNDER CONTINUED REVIEW OUR OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE "PEACE ZONE" CONCEPT AS SUCH AND TOWARD POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE SECURITY PROBLEMS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION. IN ADDITION TO EXAMINING OUR OWN POSITION, WE WILL NEED TO ASSESS THE LONGER-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET STAND THE KEEP CLOSE WATCH OVER THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPOSED CONVENING OF AN INDIAN OCEAN CONFERENCE.

J. SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE. ALTHOUGH THE PAKISTANIS HAVE MADE LITTLE PERCEPTIBLE PROGRESS TOWARD ENCOURAGING INDIAN INTEREST IN A REGIONAL AGREEMENT TO BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SOME OF OUR ALLIES (NOTABLY THE UK)

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HAVE COME TO BELIEVE THAT MORE ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR PAKISTANI EFFORTS ON THE PART OF WESTERN POWERS IS WARRANTED. THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO KEEP UNDER REVIEW OUR OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PAKISTANI PROPOSAL AND ITS RELATION TO OUR BROADER NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. AT A MINIMUM, THE UK AND PAKISTAN CAN BE EXPECTED TO PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH US OVER THE COMING MONTHS. THE ITEM WILL AGAIN BE ON THE UNGA'S AGENDA NEXT YEAR.

K. SECURITY ASSURANCES. THE PAKISTANI RESOLUTION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES CALLS FOR CONSIDERATION OF A SPECIFIC NON-USE FORMULATION DESIGNED TO MEET THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT; NAMELY, AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES " NOT PARTIES TO THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OF SOME NUCLEAR-WEAPON POWERS." THE RESOLUTION ALSO PLACES THE SUBJECT ON NEXT YEAR'S AGENDA, AND THE BROADER QUESTION OF STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES OS LIKELY TO BE OF CENTRAL INTEREST AT THE SPECIAL SESSION. ASIDE FROM PROVIDING A CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO THE FORMULATION SET OUT IN THE RESOLUTION, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE WAYS OF TRYING TO MEET CONCERNS OVER THIS QUESTION WITHOUT IMPAIRING OUR OWN AND OUR ALLIES' SECURITY INTERESTS.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
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**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DEBATES, AGREEMENT DRAFT, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS, MEETING REPORTS  
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**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** coburnhl  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
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**Review Authority:** coburnhl  
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**TAGS:** PARM, UR, US, UN, CCD  
**To:** STATE  
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